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Islam in Russia Under the Federal Law on Freedom 
of Conscience and on Religious Associations: Official 
Tolerance in an Intolerant Society 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 7000 Muslims in Tagan-
rog, a city in southern Russia, “have had nowhere to meet.”1 When 
the “community applied for permission to build a mosque, the city 
administration offered a plot of land.”2 After construction began, 
however, the non-Muslim community began expressing fears and 
concerns, sometimes violently.3 As local elections approached, 
“[T]he Cossacks issued an open letter saying they would only sup-
port a candidate opposing construction of the mosque.”4 Finally, the 
regional administration called a meeting to resolve the problem. De-
spite agreeing that religious groups have the right to build places of 
worship, the administration, “bowing to public unease, . . . agreed 
the mosque should be built without a minaret so that it would not 
be obvious as a mosque.”5 While Russia guarantees its citizens reli-
gious freedom, the unfortunate reality, as seen in this example, is 
that religious freedom is often sacrificed to the whims and prejudices 
of various authorities, especially when pressured by political majori-
ties. 
In 1997, the Russian Federation passed a new law on freedom of 
conscience.6 Many people in the West have concentrated on how this 
law affects religious freedom in Russia and the ability of non-
 
 1. Tatyana Titova, Russia: Precarious Future for Half-finished Taganrog Mosque, 
KESTON NEWS SERV. (Dec. 8, 2000) (visited Feb 8, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/ 
001208RU.htm>. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See id. One evening, “some people came to the building site, seized the guard and 
beat him up, threatening to kill him if construction continued.” Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Known as the 1997 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associa-
tions, the law determines how religions are recognized by the Russian government and what 
rights they can enjoy. See Keston Institute, Russian Federation Federal Law: “On Freedom of 
Conscience and on Religious Associations” (Lawrence A. Uzzell trans., visited Sept. 22, 1999) 
<http://serv5.law.emory.edu/EILR/special/97law.html>. 
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traditional Christian religious groups to proselyte and operate in 
Russia.7 Few people have focused on how this law affects non-
Christian religious practices such as Islam. Though Muslims have 
historically played important roles in the development of Russian his-
tory, culture, and politics, they have experienced state-sponsored dis-
crimination and repression. Currently, the government officially sup-
ports the existence of Islam in the country; however, treatment of 
Muslims by government officials indicates that intolerant attitudes 
still exist. The main obstacle for Islam under the new law is not the 
law itself, but how the law is applied in connection with historical 
and contemporary perceptions and prejudices about Muslims. 
To provide a background for understanding current perceptions 
of Islam in Russia, Part II briefly explains the history of Islam in Rus-
sia. Next, Part III examines the contemporary laws of the Russian 
Federation enacted to protect and regulate freedom of conscience 
and religion. Part IV provides a brief description of the organization 
of Islam in Russia and discusses the treatment of Muslims in different 
areas of the country. Part V suggests three main areas of concern that 
Russia should address in order to assuage the Islamic community’s 
concerns and avoid what the government fears most—a rebellion of 
the Islamic population, the likes of which have not been seen since 
Pugachev.8 This paper concludes in Part VI that while the Muslim 
population is stable and loyal to the Russian government, the situa-
tion could change quickly, especially if the government continues to 
allow police persecution of ethnic Muslims and the repression of all 
Muslims in order to control extremism and terrorism. 
II. HISTORY OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA 
From its modest beginnings over a thousand years ago, Islam has 
become a very large movement in Russia. Official state treatment of 
Islam varied over the course of time according to who was in power. 
 
 7. See W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101, 
230 (1998). 
 8. Pugachev led a fearfully successful rebellion against Russian authority in the eight-
eenth century. According to an Islamic scholar, “[i]t was the Pugachev war of 1773–1775 in 
which Muslims from the Volga and Ural areas took an active part that forced the authorities to 
[pay attention to Muslim concerns].” Marat Murtazin, Muslims and Russia: War or Peace?, 
CENT. ASIA & THE CAUCUSES J. SOC. & POL. STUD. ∗6 (visited Feb. 5, 2001) 
<http://www.ca-c.org/journal/eng01_2000/17.murtazin.shtml>. 
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Under the tsars, Muslims received some official recognition. The So-
viets, after initially ignoring the Muslims, sought to eliminate Islam 
along with all other religions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Is-
lam has experienced a rebirth. This rebirth shows that, as a religious 
minority, Muslims will have an important voice in Russia’s future. 
A. Russia and Islam Under the Tsars 
Only twenty years after it was founded in what is now Saudi Ara-
bia, Islam came to Dagestan as the result of conquest by Arab Mus-
lims.9 Conversion of the people along the Volga River (Tatarstan) 
occurred in the ninth century. In A.D. 922, the Volga Bulgars, the 
ancestors of the Tatars, adopted Islam.10 Islam did not have a strong 
presence in Russia until the Golden Horde brought contact between 
the Orthodox Russians and the Mongols.11 When the Mongols in-
vaded Russia, they did not belong to the Muslim faith.12 However, 
within a century of their invasion, the Mongols converted to Islam 
and spread the faith throughout the conquered territory.13 Some 
scholars claim that the reign of Muslim Mongols over Orthodox 
Russia created some deep-rooted antagonistic feelings in Russia to-
ward Muslims.14 
In the sixteenth century, Russia began to throw off the Mongol 
yoke and invaded and conquered traditionally Muslim areas.15 As the 
tsars took control of Volga regions and the Khanate of Kazan, where 
many Muslim groups lived, government policy towards the Muslim 
population was mostly tolerant.16 To win the loyalty of the local aris-
tocracy, the tsarist administration showed goodwill and support for 
 
 9. See Donna E. Arzt, Historical Heritage or Ethno-National Threat? Proselytizing and 
the Muslim Umma of Russia, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 413, 426 (1998). The area of southern 
Dagestan is only 500 miles away from the center of the Islamic world—Mecca and Medina. 
 10. See F.A. ASADULLIN, MUSUL’MANSKIE DUKHOVNYE ORGANIZATSII I OB’EDIN-
ENIYA ROCCIISKOI FEDERATSII [Muslim Spiritual Organizations and Associations of the Rus-
sian Federation] 11 (1999). 
 11. “The Golden Horde constituted one component of the much larger Mongol Em-
pire.” JANET MARTIN, From Kiev to Muscovy: The Beginnings to 1450, in RUSSIA: A HISTORY 
15 (Gregory L. Freeze ed., 1997). 
 12. See Shirin Akiner, Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspec-
tive, 24 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 90, 93 (1996). 
 13. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 426. 
 14. See id. at 427. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See id. at 428. 
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Islam.17 It even allocated money to construct mosques and print 
Muslim literature.18 
While Russia strengthened its ties with Muslims along the Volga, 
its contacts with Muslims in the North Caucasus were much more 
strained. Russia began to gain territory in the Caucasus in the eight-
eenth century19 but had been pushing toward that area since the time 
of Boris Godunov.20 The Russians found these Muslim people diffi-
cult to conquer. In the lower Caucus regions, Russia was unable to 
assert control over the local inhabitants until 1856, “when the last 
Sufi leader, Imam Shamil, was forced to surrender after a thirty-year 
armed struggle against colonial domination.”21 Once the people had 
been conquered, the tsars had to decide how to deal with them. 
During the time of Peter the Great, authorities in Moscow began 
to fear the existence of so many Muslims only two hundred miles 
away from the capital.22 In order to alleviate this fear, the Tsar en-
couraged the conversion of the Muslims to Orthodoxy.23 This forced 
conversion was met with extreme resistance and soured the relations 
between the Tatar Muslims and Russians.24 Few people really con-
verted, and those that did returned to Islam as soon as the govern-
ment relaxed its policies.25 
In the eighteenth century, Catherine the Great took a different 
approach to dealing with the Muslim people of southern Russia. She 
created a Muslim Spiritual Assembly centered in Orenburg, which 
“held jurisdiction over religious training and publication in both the 
European and Siberian portions of the empire.”26 This Assembly 
eventually moved to Ufa, becoming “the official central institution 
 
 17. See Akiner, supra note 12, at 99. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in 
Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 124 (1999). 
 20. Arzt, supra note 9, at 428. Boris Godunov led Russia for a time at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century. See HANS-JOACHIM TORKE, From Muscovy Towards St. Petersburg, in 
RUSSIA: A HISTORY, supra note 11, at 56–59. 
 21. Arzt, supra note 9, at 428. History shows that the people in this area, which in-
cludes Chechnya, held closer ties to the Middle East than they did to Moscow until this fight-
ing stopped in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
 22. See id. at 429. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. at 430. 
 26. Id. 
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of the Muslim clergy for the whole of Russia.”27 The creation of this 
special governmental religious institution helped the spread of Islam 
within Russia.28 These changes brought economic prosperity to the 
region and allowed the “mass construction of mosques and the pro-
motion of Islam with the support of the Russian state.”29 Her toler-
ant policies also allowed Muslims in the areas of Tatarstan and Bash-
kortostan to create strong ties with Moscow. Because of tsarist policy 
near the Revolution, “the Tatars became integrated into the empire, 
while the Caucasians remained aloof,”30 showing the disparate treat-
ment of the Muslim community in these different areas. These toler-
ant policies lasted until the Communists took over. 
B. Russia and Islam Under Communism 
At first the Communists interfered very little with Islam.31 In 
fact, some claim that “Islam at first suffered less under the Soviets 
than did Orthodoxy or Judaism.”32 Not long after the revolution, 
Lenin even sent out a decree announcing that Muslims were free to 
worship as they would.33 After a few years, however, the Soviets be-
gan repressing the Muslim faithful. In the 1930s, the Soviets forced 
madrasahs34 and mosques to close35 and suppressed the clergy.36 On 
 
 27. Sergei Filatov, Tatarstan: at the Crossroads of Islam and Orthodoxy, 26 RELIGION, 
ST. & SOC’Y 265, 266 (1998) [hereinafter Filatov, Tatarstan]. See also Sergei Filatov, Religion, 
Power and Nationhood in Sovereign Bashkortostan, 25 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 267, 269 
(1997) [hereinafter Filatov, Bashkortostan]. 
 28. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 12. 
 29. Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 269. See also Arzt, supra note 9, at 430. 
 30. Arzt, supra note 9, at 430–31. 
 31. It is interesting to note that during the revolution, the different Muslim areas of 
Russia reacted separately to the new Soviet government. In the Northern Caucuses, it took the 
Bolsheviks from the time of the revolution in 1917 until 1936 to put down a revolt in Dages-
tan and Chechnya; Tatarstan, on the other hand, became an autonomous republic in 1920. See 
Arzt, supra note 9, at 432. When a new revolt broke out in Chechnya in 1944, over a half mil-
lion people, nearly all the Chechen and Ingush population, were forcibly exiled to areas of Si-
beria and Kazakhstan. See id. at 434. Under Khrushchev, the Chechen people were finally al-
lowed to return to their homes in 1957. See id. at 435. One can see why there is little love lost 
between the Russians and the Chechens. 
 32. Id. at 431. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Islamic schools. 
 35. See Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗7. 
 36. See Michael Bourdeaux, The New Russian Law on Religion: A View from the Regions, 
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 139, 156 (1999). See also Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 271; 
Filatov, Tatarstan, supra note 27, at 267. 
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Stalin’s orders, Muslim leaders by the thousands ended up in the gu-
lag and a million Muslims were exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan.37 
From then on, the Soviets kept strict control over official Islamic 
actions by centering Islamic leadership in the government controlled 
Muslim Spiritual Administration of the European Part of the USSR 
and Siberia.38 In all, the Soviets closed or destroyed 30,000 mosques, 
and closed 14,000 Islamic religious schools.39 Despite the persecu-
tion, the Islamic tradition remained strong and quickly revived when 
the opportunity to express religion freely returned to Russia after the 
fall of the Soviet Union. 
C. Islam in Russia in the Post-Soviet Era 
Even before the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union, Islam 
experienced an incredible revival. At the present time, Muslims make 
up fifteen to eighteen percent of the Russian population—20 million 
people.40 In comparison with other Islamic nations, this high num-
ber of Muslims places Russia among Saudi Arabia and Iraq as one of 
the most populous Muslim nations.41 Currently, there are more than 
7000 operating mosques in Russia, comparable to the number in 
Egypt.42 While this may be true, it is impossible not to note that 
“until the early 1990s Checheno-Ingushetia [a Russian province in 
the Northern Caucuses] was the only Muslim republic where not a 





 37. See JIM FOREST, RELIGION IN THE NEW RUSSIA: THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON 
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION 156 (1990). 
 38. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 13. 
 39. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 436. The Chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration 
of Muslims in Ufa noted in 1930 that “[a]ll religious organizations of the Muslims are on the 
point of complete destruction and disappearance. Eighty-seven percent of regional Muslim 
centers were closed down; over 10,000 mosques out of 12,000 were also closed; from 90 to 
97 percent of the mullahs and muezzins cannot serve.” Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗7 (quoting 
a report by Rizaetdin Fakhretdinov). 
 40. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 14. 
 41. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 440. 
 42. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 14. Compare this with fact that in 1917 there 
were 14,300 mosques; by 1948, only 416 registered mosques; and in 1968 only 311. See id. at 
14–15. Appendix, Table 1 illustrates where many of these mosques are located. 
 43. Arzt, supra note 9, at 444. 
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Of the over 100 identifiable ethnic groups in Russia, more than 
twenty are considered Muslim. The Tatars, Bashkirs, and Kazakhs 
(all Turkic) and the Chechens, Avars, and Kabardianians (all Cauca-
sian) are the largest of these traditionally Muslim ethnic groups.44 
Despite this vast ethnic difference, Russian Muslims do not have any 
contentious divisions between each other.45 Reports indicate that 
conflicts between Christianity and Islam exist in Eastern Europe, in-
cluding parts of Russia; however, economic factors rather than reli-
gious factors are their root cause.46 
Under the Soviets, there were two directorates that controlled 
the spiritual activities of the Muslims: the Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims for the European part of the USSR and Siberia centered in 
Ufa and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims for the Northern Cau-
cuses centered in Makhachkala.47 Since the fall of Communism, the 
number of individual Spiritual Directorates has increased to over 
forty.48 In March 1996, many of these Spiritual Directorates met to-
gether in Moscow to discuss mutual understanding and a unified 
front concerning key problems facing the Muslim community in the 
country. As a result of this meeting, the Council of Russian Muftis 
was created August 21, 1996.49 The Council of Russian Muftis, led 
by sheik Ravil Gainutdin, has four main goals: 
 [C]onsolidation of Muslim religious organizations of the 
Russian Federation with the goal to compatibly decide the most 
important problems concerning all Russian Muslims together; 
 [C]oordination and mutual aid in the operation of each other’s 
organization; 
 [W]ork out positions in relations with the organs of the central 
and local government, the organizations representing different 
confessions, and international foreign organizations; 
  
 
 44. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 442. See also Appendix, Table 3. 
 45. See Moshe Gammer, Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus, in 
MUSLIM EURASIA: CONFLICTING LEGACIES 163 (Yaacov Ro’i ed., 1995). 
 46. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 444. 
 47. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 18. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 19. 
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     [T]he creation of necessary conditions for the observance of the 
rights and the protection of the interests of Russian Muslims.50 
The President of the Council of Russian Muftis is sheik Ravil 
Gainutdin. The Council of Russian Muftis consists of sixteen Muslim 
religious organizations known as Muslim Spiritual Directorates 
(DUM).51 The Muslim Spiritual Directorates that make up the 
Council of Russian Muftis are themselves a collection of various reli-
gious associations and groups that represent Muslims throughout the 
Russian Federation. In reality, the Council of Russian Muftis must 
try to serve the interests of thousands of local Muslim congregations. 
The largest member of the Council of Russian Muftis is the Mus-
lim Spiritual Directorate for the European Part of Russia 
(DUMER).52 Ravil Gainutdin, the current President of the Council 
of Russian Muftis, is also the president of the DUMER.53 The struc-
ture of the DUMER includes a secretariat of muftis and various de-
partments responsible for ensuring the coordination of various as-
pects of Muslim life.54 More than 150 Muslim mosques and 
organizations fall under the care of the DUMER.55 One of the more 
important tasks that the DUMER focuses on is the building of new 
mosques and the repair and restoration of mosques constructed be-
fore the revolution.56 Recently, the DUMER also arranged for the 
 
 50. Id. at 20–21. 
 51. These religious organizations include the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (DUM) 
European Part of Russia, DUM Asian Part of Russia, DUM Adygeya, DUM Bashkortostan, 
DUM Dagestan, DUM Kabardin-Balkaria, DUM Nizhni Novgorod, DUM Orenburg, DUM 
Penza, DUM Povolzhia (Saratov), DUM Tatarstan, DUM Ulyanovsk, DUM Chuvashia, 
DUM North Ossetia, DUM Ingushetia, and DUM Karachay-Cherkess. See id. at 21–23. Each 
DUM represents several registered Muslim groups located in the Russian province for which it 
is named. For example, DUM Dagestan represents 1557 registered Muslim groups from 
Dagestan. See id. at 30. 
 52. The second largest member is the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for the Asian Part of 
Russia. This organization includes sixteen associations with at least twenty-six congregations 
throughout eastern provinces of Russia. See id. at 81–86. 
 53. See id. at 39. Appendix, Table 2 lists the organizations that have become members 
of DUMER. 
 54. These departments are divided into the following areas of responsibility: science and 
communication with the authorities of the Russian Federation, coordination of religious or-
ganizations, Islamic instruction, administration, charity, publications, public relations, ritual 
services, security council, organization of pilgrimages, and the production of food according to 
Muslim dietary laws. See id. at 42–43. 
 55. See id. at 43. 
 56. See id. at 45. 
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transmission of Muslim programs on major radio and television sta-
tions.57 While religious freedom has only truly existed in Russia for a 
short while, the Muslims have been able to develop important struc-
tures and organizations to strengthen and support the Muslim faith-
ful. 
III. A SURVEY OF LAW ON RELIGION IN RUSSIA 
Under the Communists, the Soviet government tightly regulated 
and closely supervised religion and belief. Beginning even before 
Gorbachev’s introduction of glasnost, a rebirth of religious interest 
began to develop among the citizenry. With the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the excitement of newfound freedom led to the passage of 
very liberal laws guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, or the abil-
ity to believe as one wants. Since the euphoria of freedom has worn 
off, however, the government has retreated from its original liberal 
stand. In 1997, Russia passed a law concerning the freedom of con-
science that exemplifies the feelings that now permeate the Russian 
Federation that religion should be more closely regulated by the 
government. This section first examines the 1990 law concerning 
freedom of conscience. Then it will explore the sections on religious 
freedom contained in the 1993 Constitution. Finally, it will discuss 
the 1997 law and its effects on religion in Russia. 
A. The 1990 Soviet Law and Religious Freedom 
Shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s 
reforms had paved the way for the passage of a very liberal law on re-
ligious freedom. In 1990, Russia passed the Law on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Organizations,58 “guarantee[ing] full 
equality of all religious groups.”59 This law closely followed the lan-
guage of such international legal documents as the Convention for 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the 
 
 57. See id. at 47. 
 58. See ALEKSANDR SHCHIPKOV, VO CHTO VERIT ROCCIIA [What Does Russia Believe] 
264 (1998). 
 59. Irina G. Basova, Comment, Freedom Under Fire: The New Russian Religious Law, 
14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 181, 186–87 (2000). See also Arina Lekhel, Note, Leveling the 
Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Free-
dom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 167, 189–90 
(1999). 
16PRE-FIN.DOC 7/4/01  11:13 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
782 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.60 At the time, 
this action constituted a radical change from the government’s pre-
vious official position of state-mandated atheism and strict control 
over religious life.61 
B. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and Religious 
Freedom 
In December 1993, the citizens in the Russian Federation voted 
for a new constitution. Not without its problems, this constitution 
became “the first to be adopted by [an] all-people’s vote” and not in 
conformity with the old communist tradition.62 The Constitution 
became the supreme law of the land and still applies to the Russian 
government’s actions today. 
The Constitution specifically speaks to the issue of religion and 
conscience. Article 13 of the Constitution forbids the formation of 
any group that incites religious enmity.63 Article 14 establishes the 
Russian Federation as a secular state and states that “[n]o religion 
may be established as State or obligatory.”64 In addition, Article 14 
holds that “[r]eligious associations shall be separate from the State 
and equal before the law.”65 These articles establish the principle of 
separation of church and state as a foundation of the Russian Federa-
tion. To emphasize the importance of this language, Article 15 pro-
claims that the Constitution will “have the highest legal force” in the 
land and that all other laws or legal actions “must not be contrary to 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”66 
 
 60. See Lekhel, supra note 59, at 190. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights established an international norm protecting religious freedoms. See Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 61. See Basova, supra note 59, at 187. 
 62. RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A 
MARKET ECONOMY 2 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds. & William E. Butler 
trans., 1998). 
 63. See KONST. RF art. 13, ¶ 5 (1993) in RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62 at 7 
(“The creation and activity of social associations whose purposes or actions are directed to-
wards the forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and a violation of the 
integrity of the Russian Federation, subverting the security of the State, the creation of armed 
formations, incitement of social, racial, nationality, and religious enmity shall be prohibited.”). 
 64. Id. art. 14, ¶ 1. 
 65. Id. art. 14, ¶ 2. 
 66. Id. art. 15, ¶ 1. 
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The second chapter of the Constitution sets out the rights that 
individual citizens will enjoy under the protection of the Constitu-
tion and guarantees equal application of rights and freedoms.67 Even 
though the Constitution allows for the freedom of thought and 
speech, this freedom is limited if it incites people to religious enmity 
and hatred.68 Most importantly, the Constitution protects the free-
dom of conscience and religious belief.69 One cannot read the 1993 
Constitution of the Russian Federation and not feel that the docu-
ment was truly intended to protect people’s rights to believe as their 
conscience dictated. However, politicians apparently became uncom-
fortable with the non-regulation of religion, and, four years later, 
they enacted a law controlling and regulating religion. 
C. The 1997 Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on 
Religious Associations 
Even as early as 1993, some moves were made attempting to re-
strict the activities of certain religious groups. A proposed law to 
prohibit the proselytizing and activity of non-traditional religions 
was introduced into the Russian Supreme Soviet in July 1993.70 This 
law even received the support of an important Muslim leader, Mufti 
Talgat Tadzhuddin.71 President Yeltsin vetoed the proposal because 
it violated the Russian Federation’s international treaty obligations 
and the 1978 Russian Constitution (the 1993 Constitution had not 
been adopted yet).72 
By 1997, the same proposal surfaced again, this time with more 
 
 67. See id. art. 19, ¶ 2 (“The State shall guarantee the equality of rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen irrespective of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official po-
sition, place of residence, attitude towards religion, convictions, affiliation to social associa-
tions, and also other circumstances. Any forms of the limitation of the rights of citizens accord-
ing to indicia of social, racial, nationality, language, or religious affiliation shall be 
prohibited.”). 
 68. See id. art. 29, ¶ 2 (“Propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, nationality, or 
religious enmity and hatred shall not be permitted. Propaganda of social, racial, nationality, 
religious, or linguistic supremacy shall be prohibited.”). 
 69. The Constitution states that “[e]ach shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience, 
freedom of religious belief, including the right to propagate any religion individually or jointly 
with others, or not to propagate, freely choose, have, and disseminate religious and other con-
victions and to act in accordance with them.” Id. art. 28. 
 70. See RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62, at 116. 
 71. See JOHN ANDERSON, RELIGION, STATE AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND 
SUCCESSOR STATES 197 (1994). 
 72. See RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62, at 116. 
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support. An initial version of the law quickly passed through the 
State Duma and the Supreme Soviet in late June and early July of 
1997. In September, a revised version of the law was submitted, 
passed by the State Duma and the Supreme Soviet, and signed by 
President Yeltsin into law on September 26, 1997.73 This revised ver-
sion of the law recognized certain religions as traditionally Russian, 
but gave special recognition to Orthodoxy. The preamble pro-
claimed “the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of 
Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spiritu-
ality and culture; respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism 
and other religions and creeds which constitute an inseparable part 
of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples. . . .”74 While the Soviet 
Union had also officially recognized all of these traditional faiths, but 
only allowed them to operate under tight regulation, this new law 
gave the traditional religions full legal status.75 Interestingly, an ear-
lier version of the law would have placed Islam on a nearly equal 
footing with Orthodoxy.76 The actual text of that proposed preamble 
noted that “‘[o]rthodoxy as an inseparable part of the All-Russian 
historical, spiritual and cultural heritage, and equally Islam with its 
millions of members, and also Buddhism, Judaism and other religions 
traditionally existing in the Russian Federation.’”77 This version 
failed to pass, however. 
The 1997 law regulates all religious associations, but treats these 
associations differently depending on their type. A “religious organi-
zation” enjoys certain legal privileges that are not extended to “reli-
gious groups,” but an “organization” must have “existed on the 
given territory for no less than fifteen years” or be part of a central-
ized religious organization.78 A “religious group” has limited privi-
leges and protections.79 The law includes many prohibitions against  
 
 73. See id. at 117. 
 74. Keston Institute, supra note 6. 
 75. See ICRF world report/CIS(former Soviet Union)/Russia (visited Sept. 29, 1999) 
<http:\\www.religiousfreedom.com>. 
 76. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Amendment to Elevate Islam, KESTON NEWS SERV., June 
20, 1997. This action would have put Islam by implication “ahead of Buddhism and Judaism.” 
Id. 
 77. Arzt, supra note 9, at 423 (quoting Lawrence Uzell, Additional Amendments to 
Law on Religion for “Third Reading”, KESTON NEWS SERV., June 22, 1997 (emphasis omit-
ted). 
 78. Keston Institute, supra note 6, art. 9.1. 
 79. See id. art. 7. 
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government intervention and specific protections that allow for the 
free exercise of conscience and religion.80 
According to official publications from the Council of Russian 
Muftis and the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for the European part of 
Russia, the 1997 law is a success. The Council of Russian Muftis cite 
their “participation in the preparation and acceptance of the Federal 
Law ‘On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.’”81 
as an important reflection of their influence with the government. 
When preparing the law, the opinions of all the muftis in the Council 
were considered.82 The Council of Russian Muftis supports the 1997 
law whole-heartedly. 
Even though Islam is afforded special recognition as a traditional 
religion under the 1997 law, the true impact of the law is not its lan-
guage, but the method and manner by which it is implemented.83 
Russia has had a long history of state control over religious organiza-
tions for political purposes.84 Even now, though freedom of con-
science exists and the state professes to not interfere with religious 
observances, political control of religion plays a prominent role in 
government.85 In addition, the resurgence of nationalism and the 
fear of terrorism have caused latent discriminatory practices to in-
crease. 
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA 
Like all other religions, Islamic organizations must register under 
the 1997 law to receive the benefits afforded religious organizations. 
For the most part, Islamic religious organizations have not experi-
enced difficulties registering under the new law. However, certain 
problem areas have become apparent, Chechnya being one of the 
most extreme. In addition, Muslims find that ancient prejudices 
combined with current crises continue to impede the freedom of 
 
 80. See id. art. 3. 
 81. ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 23. 
 82. See id. at 24. 
 83. See Durham & Homer, supra note 7, at 230. 
 84. See supra Part II. 
 85. See infra Part IV.C.1.a. 
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conscience and belief in Russia.86 An annual report by the U.S. State 
Department states that “[d]iscriminatory practices at the local level 
also are attributable to the increased decentralization of power over 
the past several years and the relatively greater susceptibility of local 
governments to lobbying by majority religions, as well as to govern-
ment inaction and discriminatory attitudes that are widely held in so-
ciety.”87 This section first discusses the history and existence of 
Wahhabism in Russia today. Next, it looks at the Muslim communi-
ties’ ability to register under the 1997 law. Then it explores the 
situation in the two different strongly Muslim areas of Russia: the 
Caucasus, specifically Dagestan, Chechnya, and the Volga region in-
cluding Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 
A. Wahhabism in Russia 
Wahhabism has existed for hundreds of years and, in the last few 
decades, has become very popular in Russia.88 In the eighteenth cen-
tury, a religious and political movement developed “out of the ideas 
of Muhammad ibn Abd-el Wahhab.”89 The movement sought to pu-
rify Islam of alterations that had occurred over time and insisted on 
“strictly follow[ing] customs existing during Prophet Muhammad’s 
lifetime.”90 At the time, Muhammad ibn Abd-el Wahhab felt that 
too many Muslims had strayed from the principal teachings of Islam; 
his movement was a response to revive the faith.91 
Many of the principles espoused by the Wahhabites are shared by 
all Muslims. “It teaches the Muslims to follow the Sunna of the 
Prophet and be good, cautious, keep their promises, exercise pa-
tience, do not tell lies, spread slander or rumors, help those who 
need help, do not be stingy, envious, cowards or to perjure.”92 
However, it also “developed an extreme intolerance of the non-
 
 86. For a prime example, see supra Part I. 
 87. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA (Sept. 5, 2000) 
(visited Apr. 27, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
irf_russia.html>, at ∗1 [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 88. “[T]his trend in Islam [Wahhabism] is growing stronger not only in the Caucasus 
but also throughout Russia.” “No Wahhabis” in Karachay-Cherkess Republic, IZVESTIAYA, May 
6, 2000. 
 89. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗8. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at ∗9. 
 92. Id. 
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Muslims and those Muslims who followed different Islamic 
trends.”93 It is because of their intolerance, which often leads to vio-
lence, that Wahhabism has earned the wrath of the Russian govern-
ment and even of Muslim organizations and communities.94 
B. Muslim Registration Under the 1997 Law 
The U.S. State Department maintains records regarding the reg-
istration of religious groups under Russia’s 1997 law. As of January 
1999, “over half of registered [religious] organizations were Russian 
Orthodox, 18 percent were Muslim, and 20 percent were Christian 
organizations other than Russian Orthodox.”95 Nearly 16,750 or-
ganizations had been registered, representing 57 confessions, but an 
estimated 15,000 more organizations remained to be registered by 
the end of 1999.96 Only a year later, the U.S. State Department re-
ported that only seven hundred more religious organizations had 
registered at the national level.97 According to the report, local Mus-
lim organizations are still struggling to register because of conflicts 
between the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European 
Russia and Siberia (Central Spiritual Directorate), based in Ufa, and 
the Moscow-based Russian Council of Muftis.98 One problem caus-
ing this delay was that “local authorities in some cases were obstruct-
ing the registration of local organizations that wished to join [the 
Russian Council of Muftis] rather than [the Central Spiritual Direc-
torate], and that those who wished to leave [the Central] Spiritual 
Directorate were being accused of ‘Wahhabism.’”99 
 
 93. Id. at ∗10. 
 94. See id. 
 95. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA (Sept. 9, 1999) 
(visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
1999/irf_russia99.html>, at ∗1 [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT].  
 96. See id. at ∗4. 
 97. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87. “According to January 2000 [Russian] 
Ministry of Justice statistics, there are now 17,427 religious organizations registered nation-
wide.” Id. at ∗6. 
 98. See id. (as reported by the Keston Institute in May 2000). 
 99. Id. at ∗7. Wahhabism is a Muslim sect that has become associated with terrorism. 
“In the Russian context, ‘Wahhabism,’ the name of a strict branch of Sunni Islam that origi-
nated in Saudi Arabia, has become a pejorative term because of persistent allegations that 
‘Wahhabi extremism’ is to blame for terrorist attacks linked to Chechnya.” Id. at ∗7. See supra 
Part V.C. 
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Under an extension granted by acting President Vladimir Putin 
in March 2000, religious organizations had until December 31, 
2000 to register under to the 1997 law.100 Religious groups or 
organizations that failed to meet the deadline may be liquidated—
that is, deprived of legal personality—which includes “the right to 
publish, import or distribute literature, invite foreign citizens, form 
rental agreements or conduct charitable activity.”101 According to the 
Keston Institute,102 the first known cases brought in court to liqui-
date unregistered religious organizations include thirty-seven Muslim 
communities.103 Only one non-Muslim organization, a Jehovah’s 
Witness congregation, suffered the same fate.104 The cases, brought 
by authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria, a republic in the North Cauca-
sus, involved Muslim communities that failed to register because the 
process was too complex.105 Many other religious groups will suffer 
the same fate, but it appears that Islamic communities will suffer 
first. 
C. Specific Examples of Intolerance and Discrimination Against 
Muslims 
A large percentage of Russian Muslims are concentrated in two 
distinct parts of the country: the North Caucasus (near the former 
Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and the 
Volga region including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (bordering on 
the former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan). The Muslims who live in 
and near Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have closer social and histori-
cal ties to Russia.106 The Southern provinces (in an area called the 
 
 100. See Tatyana Titova, Russia: Muslims First for Mandatory Liquidation, KESTON NEWS 
SERV. (Jan. 24, 2001) (visited Feb. 2, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/010124RU.htm>. 
Before the extension was granted, all religious organizations had to register by December 31, 
1999, according to the actual terms of the 1997 law. 
 101. Id. 
 102. The Keston Institute is an organization that has been monitoring the status of reli-
gious freedom in the former Soviet Union for the last thirty years. See The Work of Keston Insti-
tute (visited Apr. 30, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/infoframe.htm>. 
 103. See Titova, supra note 100. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. 
 106. One author commented that in Tatarstan, at least, this is a result of “a particular 
mentality inclined to tolerance, compromise and obedience to authority.” Alexei Zverev, 
Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting Loyalties, in 
CONFLICTING LOYALTIES AND THE STATE IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND EURASIA 118, 142 
(Michael Waller et al. eds., 1998). 
16PRE-FIN.DOC 7/4/01  11:13 AM 
773] Islam in Russia 
 789 
North Caucuses) have less association with Russia and are closer in 
spirit (and in geography) to the Muslim nations of the Middle 
East.107 This section discusses the experience of the Muslim commu-
nities in each of these areas. 
1. Muslims in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan 
a. Tatarstan. Even though Islam is the majority religion in Tatar-
stan, Muslims still find it difficult to practice their religion freely. 
This situation exists more from the political situation in Tatarstan 
than from anything else. The elected president of Tatarstan, Menti-
mer Shaimiyev, has prohibited the return of Muslim, Orthodox, and 
Catholic buildings, and has used his power as president to influence 
Muslim leadership. While the government interferes in religion, so-
cietal attitude toward religion is very open. Muslim and Orthodox 
leaders have positive and peaceful relations. Some attribute this good 
relationship to “the fact that Tatarstan has been part of Russia for 
more than four centuries” and that “[t]he Tatars’ brand of Islam is 
more Europeanised.”108 The strong ties to Russia and the good rela-
tions between religious leaders have allowed Tatarstan to remain free 
of tension between religious groups. However, tension between the 
government and religion has been growing. 
This tension between the government and religion can be seen in 
several examples. When Catholic priests came to Tatarstan to revive 
the Roman Catholic parish, they received a warm welcome from the 
Orthodox Bishop.109 After their arrival, the Catholics found opposi-
tion, not from other religions, but from the government. While try-
ing to register congregations, the authorities “kept changing the 
number of signatures required.”110 In addition, the government re-
fused to return the Catholic Church in Kazan that was built in 
1858.111 When the Catholics inquired about another church located 
 
 107. See Christian Caryl, Is Putin Fomenting a Holy War?, NEW STATESMAN, May 1, 
2000, at 21. 
 108. Lawrence A. Uzzell, Orthodox and Muslims Build Common Front in Tatarstan, 
KESTON NEWS SERV., July 8, 1996 [hereinafter Common Front]. 
 109. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Priests from Argentina Revive Catholic Parish in Kazan, 
KESTON NEWS SERV., July 8, 1996. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. According to the government, the building’s occupant, an aviation institute, 
could not spare any room. See id. 
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in a cemetery, the authorities indicated that the building would be  
 
returned.112 However, they refused to put this promise in writing and 
refused to return the building immediately. 
Catholics are not the only religious group to have difficulty ob-
taining return of pre-Communism church buildings; Muslims have 
also struggled to obtain the return of mosques. President Shaimiyev 
“has only voluntarily returned ancient churches or mosques to their 
historic owners only when such buildings have no commercial or po-
litical value.”113 Many of these historic buildings lie in the center of 
Kazan, and President Shaimiyev consistently denies the return of 
these buildings because they lie in an area highly prized by 
businessmen and bureaucrats.114 After waiting for the return of a 
madrasah, or divinity school, Muslims turned to civil disobedience, 
and for five days they occupied the building. 
Showing mutual support, Bishop Anastasi of the Orthodox 
Church visited the Muslim protesters.115 Similarly, when the Ortho-
dox hold cross-bearing processions to the Kazan’s city hall or to fed-
eral buildings, they often find Muslims joining in their protest.116 
Muslim leaders have made statements supporting these Orthodox at-
tempts to obtain return of their churches. The government claims it 
is only trying to represent the Muslim interests by not returning Or-
thodox buildings, but that does not explain why the government re-
fuses to return Muslim buildings. The head mufti of the Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate in Tatarstan denied that the government acted 
on behalf of Muslims and supported the return of the churches to 
the Orthodox.117 Reportedly, even Muslim businessmen have con-
tributed financially to aid the Orthodox in restoring churches.118 The 
numbers of Muslims and Orthodox are about equal in Tatarstan, and 
religious leaders recognize the need “to live in peace and to avoid 
being divided from each other.”119 The cause of these problems is 
the political aspirations of the province’s president rather than any 
 
 112. See id. 
 113. Common Front, supra note 108. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. 
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religious antagonism between Muslims and Christians. 
 
b. Bashkortostan. Similar to the inhabitants of the neighboring 
province Tatarstan, a majority of people in Bashkortostan consider 
themselves Muslim.120 Like most of Russia, the believers of different 
faiths tend to follow along ethnic lines. When religious freedom ap-
peared in Bashkortostan after 1988, people returned to the religion 
of their ancestors: “Tatars and Bashkirs to Islam, Russians to Ortho-
doxy, Udmurts and Mari to paganism, Germans to Lutheranism.”121 
The Orthodox and Muslim leaders have denounced Protestant 
proselytism.122 While some extremist views exist among the Muslim 
clergy, “[t]he religious faith of the main body of believers . . . is 
however quite different—antidogmatic, open, even eclectic.”123 
Many Muslim youth in Bashkortostan feel that their religious leaders 
too deferentially support the province’s secular authorities.124 If the 
young Islamic reformers in the province had their way, Islamic law 
would play a more important role in government decisions. Few 
support their ideas, however, and most prefer the secular govern-
ment to remain secular. 
2. The North Caucasus 
a. Dagestan. A strongly Islamic province, Dagestan boasts the 
greatest number of mosques and Muslim organizations of any prov-
ince in Russia.125 Comparing the number of Muslim and Christian 
organizations in the province shows the extent of the influence of Is-
lam in Dagestan. According to the Committee for Religious Affairs 
in Dagestan, “there are 15 Christian religious organisations in 
Dagestan.”126 This compares with 1,559 Muslim organizations regis-
tered in Dagestan.127 As most places in Russia, Dagestan has experi-
 
 120. Of the nearly four million people who live in Bashkortostan, two million belong to 
traditionally Muslim ethnic groups—the Bashkorts and the Tatars. See DAVID C. LEWIS, AFTER 
ATHEISM: RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA 44 (2000). 
 121. Sergei Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 272. 
 122. See id. at 274. 
 123. Id. at 275. 
 124. See id. at 277. 
 125. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 30–31. 
 126. Nabi Abdullayev et al., Dagestan’s Silent Catholics, KESTON NEWS SERV., July 12, 
1999. 
 127. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 30. 
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enced a great religious revival. While most people would have  
 
considered themselves atheists while the Soviet Union still existed, 
“[n]ow 90% of people say they’re Muslims.”128 
Traditionally, the people of Dagestan follow Sufi Islam, but the 
fundamentalist Wahhabi movement is growing in the area.129 Be-
cause most people, especially those in control, oppose the Wahhabi 
movement in favor of Sufi, a different and less extreme form of Is-
lam, “combined opposition by Sufi sheiks, the mufti and the local 
government has stopped the Wahhabi from open worship.”130 While 
the government has fought against the Wahhabi movement, its mes-
sage of renewal and promise of change draws more and more people 
to join its numbers. 
Recently, extremist Wahhabites from Chechnya tried to create a 
popular uprising in Dagestan. Expecting support from the local 
Wahhabite population, these insurgents instead found “the over-
whelming majority of the . . . Wahhabites distanced themselves from 
the fighting.”131 Like many other provinces, Dagestan passed its own 
law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations.”132 In 
passing that law, the Dagestani government “intended to restrict 
Wahhabite activity.”133 After the attack, the government found the 
law “to be too lenient” and decided that “authorities had tolerated 
Wahhabism for too long.”134 In some places, government and spiri-
tual leaders have repressed Wahhabite followers by destroying 
Wahhabite mosques, driving Wahhabite followers out of villages, or 
placing Wahhabite followers under house arrest.135 Other actions in-
clude searching the houses of religious leaders and scholars (whose 
loyalty is questionable) for extremist literature and destroying televi-
sion transmitters used for extremists’ broadcasts.136 
 
 128. Vanora Bennett, Islamic Fervor Unnerves Russia’s South, BICNEWS, Oct. 27, 1997. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Nabi Abdullayev, Crackdown on Dagestan Muslims May be Self-Defeating, KESTON 
NEWS SERV., Sept. 1, 1999. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. See also 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗16. 
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By strongly repressing the Wahhabite movement, however, the 
government is creating a greater problem. “So far the result of such 
repression has been to make the indigenous Wahhabites more nu-
merous and more militant.”137 Instead of suppressing the movement, 
the government actions actually foster its growth. 
b. Chechnya. For the last several years, Russian Federation Forces 
have been fighting in Chechnya, trying to bring this republic back 
under Russian control. After winning some independence in 1996, 
Chechnya experimented with Sharia law based on the Koran.138 Re-
cently, a number of Christian religious leaders were kidnapped; some 
were killed.139 Many fear that the Muslim extremists in Chechnya are 
specifically targeting Christians.140 “It is not clear if this is connected 
with growing Islamic awareness at a time when Chechnya is moving 
rapidly to become an Islamic state or whether it is because the over-
whelming majority of the Christians that remain in Chechnya are 
ethnic Russians.”141 In April of 1999, the leading religious affairs of-
ficial in Chechnya was kidnapped.142 Though a practicing Muslim, 
this official “was instrumental in trying to promote harmony be-
tween different faiths and in channeling humanitarian aid into 
[Chechnya].”143 His attitude toward other religions and his criticism 
of the current regime probably led to his kidnapping.144 
Russia’s position towards Chechnya poses a great problem affect-
ing relations between the government and Islamic followers. Histori-
cally, Russia has long had poor relations with the Chechen people.145 
If the government uses the conflict in Chechnya as an excuse to 
abuse and discriminate against all Muslims, Russia may incite other, 
now peaceful, Muslim citizens to violence. 
c. Stavropol. Even though the province of Stavropol is located in 
the region of the Northern Caucuses, it does not have a significant 
 
 137. Abdullayev, supra note 131. 
 138. See Bennett, supra note 128. 
 139. See Felix Corley & Lawrence Uzzell, Chechen Religious Affairs Official Kidnapped, 
KESTON NEWS SERV., May 11, 1999. 
 140. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗13. 
 141. Corley & Uzzell, supra note 139. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See supra Part II.B. 
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population of Muslims. Its proximity to Chechnya, though, makes 
the government wary of Muslim activities in the province. In fact, 
“Stavropol is one of the few provincial capitals in Russia without 
regular, public Muslim worship services.”146 A Muslim congregation 
registered with the government in 1993, but it has been deprived of 
a meeting place ever since.147 The government even denies the Mus-
lims access to the mosque built before the Bolshevik Revolution.148 
While tolerating the appearance of other Protestant groups, the gov-
ernment in Stavropol has fought against the Muslim community. On 
one occasion, “police broke up a Muslim worship service that was 
meeting in a private apartment,” an interference that has not hap-
pened to any Christian or Jewish group.149 
Attempting to assist the Muslims, the Orthodox Metropolitan of 
Stavropol tried to petition the government to return the mosque to 
the Muslims. The Orthodox Church enjoys a good relationship with 
the Muslims in the area, and Metropolitan Gideon, the Orthodox 
Metropolitan of Stavropol, “believes that the Muslims should have a 
place of their own in which to worship.”150 A letter written by the 
Metropolitan on behalf of the Muslims failed to convince the gov-
ernment to relent.151 The government claimed that it “will never do 
anything to stop the Muslims from practising their faith,”152 but it 
argued that since “90 percent of the city’s population was Rus-
sian, . . . a mosque was not needed.”153 
Some blame the government’s behavior on the difficulties in 
Chechnya.154 Native Russians are afraid of the growth of what is 
called “Wahhabism,” a word that has, unfortunately and for mostly 
political reasons, become synonymous with Islamic extremism.155 In 
 
 146. Lawrence A. Uzzell & Roman Lunkin, Stavropol Represses Muslims, Tolerates Inde-
pendent Protestants, KESTON NEWS SERV., Oct. 28, 1999 [hereinafter Stavropol Represses]. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Whither Human Rights in Russia? Hearing Before the Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Larry Uzzell, Moscow Represen-
tative, Keston Institute). 
 150. Stavropol Represses, supra note 146. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. (quoting a deputy of the provincial duma). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. The Soviets labeled and depicted Islam and Muslim beliefs and practices “as tradi-
tional, irrational, reactionary, fanatical, anti-progressive, evil, oppressive, superstitious, anti-
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April 1999, the Stavropol prosecutor deported eight foreign citizens 
for preaching what is called “Wahhabism” but what is really Islamic 
fundamentalism.156 However, “[t]he head of the FSB (the relabelled 
KGB) for the province . . . [suggests] that one way for the secular 
authorities to counter the ‘Wahhabi’ extremists was to support those 
forms of Islam which were traditional in the region.”157 If the gov-
ernment would support the traditional Muslim community instead of 
fighting all forms of Islam, then extremist views would not attract 
the Islamic believers who can freely practice their religion. 
V. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED CHANGES TO IMPROVE RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM FOR THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RUSSIA 
Muslims have spread throughout Russia. In Moscow, nearly one 
in twenty people is Muslim.158 Even though Muslims permeate the 
country, Muslims in Russia experience discrimination and persecu-
tion from other citizens and even from the government.159 This must 
change; Russia must recognize that it is a pluralistic society. Three 
main areas of concern need to be addressed to bring about this 
change. First, societal attitudes towards Muslims show a lack of ac-
ceptance and tolerance that could lead to disruptions like those seen 
in the former Yugoslavia if they continue unchanged. Second, gov-
ernment officials who interfere with the operations of Muslim com-
munities increase the likelihood of offending the Muslim population 
and driving them to extreme movements that vow to exclude gov-
ernment from religious interference.160 Finally, in their attempt to 
 
modern, the epitome of backwardness, and ultimately the ‘opiate of the people’; therefore 
[people] presumed [Muslims] to be the legitimate object of vilification and destruction.” M. 
NAZIF SHAHRANI, Islam and the Political Culture of “Scientific Atheism” in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 273, 277 
(Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995). While the Soviets determined the Wahhabis to be a problem-
atic militant Islamic movement, the people labeled Wahhabi by the government often turned 
out to be neither Wahhabi nor extremists. See MURIEL ATKIN, Islam as Faith, Politics, and 
Bogeyman in Tajikistan, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF 
EURASIA 247, 252 (Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995). 
 156. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗7. 
 157. Stavropol Represses, supra note 146. 
 158. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 450. 
 159. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗15. 
 160. The extreme movements are more likely to be those that call for the establishment 
of religious, or Sharia, law. By taking positions contrary to the feeling of the Muslim people, 
most of whom are not ethnic Russians, the government fails to make the people feel united 
and cause the many Muslims to “identify more with outside forces, with the ideology of Islam 
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fight terrorism, the Russian government has focused on 
Wahhabism—or Islamic extremism—but trying to eradicate terror-
ism by denying religious freedoms to certain populations negatively 
affects the religious freedoms of all Muslims. Finally, the Russian 
government must realize that it cannot ignore the needs and con-
cerns of the Islamic community anymore. If these changes are not 
made, the application of the 1997 law by local officials, state sup-
ported aggression against the Wahhabi, and continuing societal 
prejudice could lead to violent religious clashes. 
A. The Attitude of Russians Toward Islam 
Societal attitudes toward Islam determine government action and 
Muslim reactions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians have 
been trying to identify a new national character. Unfortunately, 
many use religion to identify national character. Russia faces the 
unique position, however, of close proximity to Muslim nations and 
a large Muslim minority.161 These considerations have caused an ex-
treme dichotomy. On the one hand, “Islam is rejected as a distinct 
ethnoconfessional system . . . [and] there is a fear of the integration-
ist potential of Islam, which is capable not only of rallying the Mus-
lim states bordering on Russia, but also of mobilizing Muslims inside 
the Russian Federation itself.”162 On the other hand, “Russian na-
tionalism has a desire to stress once more the multi-confessional basis 
of Russia . . . [and views] Islam . . . as an objective ally in the strug-
gle against the expansion of the West.”163 These conflicting national-
ist sentiments keep prejudice against Islam from growing too strong, 
but it is a very precarious balance that could easily shift to the ex-
treme. 
1. Prejudicial attitudes against Muslims 
Since Moscow is the capital city, the government’s attitude to-
 
and the countries of the Muslim world.” Fred Weir, Republics in Caucasus Estranged from 
Moscow; Frontier Strife May be Tip of Troubled Iceberg, Christian Science Monitor, August 15, 
1999, at C11. 
 161. See Aleksei Malashenko, Russian Nationalism and Islam, in CONFLICTING 
LOYALTIES AND THE STATE, supra note 105, at 187, 188 [hereinafter Malashenko, Russian 
Nationalism]. 
 162. Id. at 189. 
 163. Id. 
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ward Muslims there should greatly reflect the attitude of the gov-
ernment towards Muslims generally. As a large metropolis, Moscow 
draws its population from the far corners of the nation. Nearly one 
million Muslims live in Moscow and the surrounding area.164 Since 
the time of Catherine the Great, and perhaps as early as the fifteenth 
century, Muslims have lived in Moscow.165 Unfortunately, the feel-
ings among Muscovites and most Russians are very critical of Mus-
lims despite their long history of coexistence.166 
Recent polls and other studies show that “Russians consistently 
rate peoples of the Caucasus as those they dislike the most.”167 Rus-
sians call the people from the Caucasus regions “black.”168 In Mos-
cow, “[d]ark skinned residents, whether legal or illegal, whether citi-
zens of the Russian Federation or citizens of other CIS169 countries, 
are subjected to multiple identification checks every day.”170 These 
Caucasian people come from many different religious backgrounds, 
but many are Muslim or come from traditionally Muslim areas.171 
Caucasians “are also subject to random searches, illegal seizure of 
property, including automobiles, extortion, inordinate fines, deten-
tion without charge for up to several weeks, and beatings—
particularly of the kidneys—while in custody.”172 While authorities 
treat all Caucasians poorly, some ethnic groups among the 
Caucasians receive worse treatment than others. 
Among the worst treated of the Caucasians, Chechens are par-
ticularly subject to persecution. “Chechens are especially prone to 
being round up and often deported under a series of 1993 city and 
federal ordinances on ‘regulating the residences of refugees,’ fighting 
crime, and implementing the propiska (residence requirement) sys-
 
 164. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 450. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 451. These polls were all taken before the recent fighting in Chechnya began. 
 168. Id. To be a Caucasian in Russia is to have olive skin and dark hair—not the white-
skinned Europeans people associate with that word in the United States. 
 169. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, some of the former Soviet Republics formed 
a loose alliance called the Commonwealth of Independent States (ICS). 
 170. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 451. When I was in St. Petersburg in 1995, I noticed, as a 
passenger, that the car I was in was much more likely to be stopped by police if the driver was 
from the Caucuses than if the driver was a Russian. 
 171. See supra Part II.C. 
 172. Arzt, supra note 9, at 452. 
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tem.”173 Authorities blamed Chechens for a series of bombings in 
1996 even though no suspects had been identified,174 and for the re-
cent bombings in Moscow killing hundreds of people.175 During the 
parliamentary rebellion against Boris Yeltsin in 1993, “Moscow au-
thorities stepped up the purge of Chechens and other dark-skinned 
peoples.”176 Police have raided mosques claiming to search for weap-
ons and criminals.177 These actions do not endear Muslims to the 
Russian authorities, nor does it seem that the government is doing 
anything to ensure that the Muslim minority is protected from unfair 
treatment by police. If the treatment of Muslims in Moscow is any 
indication of an official or unofficial domestic policy and if such 
treatment continues, the Muslim population may turn more rebel-
lious and turn to extremists who promise to protect them from the 
government’s intolerant behavior. 
Some have claimed that “Russia and the United States share a 
common perspective on the Islamic world: both have an inordinate 
fear of ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ or more accurately, militant Islamic 
revivalism.”178 This fear tends to increase the negative perception of 
Islam, and increases the potential for abuse by authorities. Not only 
is it possible that the 1997 law will be restrictively applied to Mus-
lims,179 but “Islam has the potential of being linked with political 
and ideological resistance, and has been so linked in Russian history, 
particularly during periods of intensive Russification campaigns 
against cultural minorities.”180 
2. The attitude toward Russian Muslims 
After seventy years of communist rule, Russians are striving to 
rediscover their roots and to develop a new national identity. Under 
the Communists, Islam became secularized, and most Muslims main-
 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 453. 
 175. See Russians Continue to Lean on Grozny, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 18, 1999. 
 176. Arzt, supra note 9, at 453. 
 177. See id. at 454. 
 178. Id. at 468. 
 179. See id. at 472. For example, the local administrator of a city near Moscow has re-
fused for years to allow the construction of a mosque because “‘Islam is not traditional for this 
region of Russia.’” Id. (quoting Tatiana Varzanova, Muslims are Opening Mosques, Although 
Some Are Obstructed (visited Nov. 1996) <http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews>). 
 180. Id. at 473. 
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tained only a superficial belief; “[t]heir knowledge . . . was reduced 
to a very few practices.”181 Just as Russians are trying to establish a 
new national identity, Muslim minorities are returning to their roots 
as well. “Their national consciousness is tied to their religious feel-
ing.”182 Ethnic minorities that were traditionally associated with Is-
lam are turning to religion, some say, because they “see in it an al-
ternative to everything that the Soviet regime represented and stood 
for, including the secularism that was a basic Soviet value.”183 Others 
point out that ethnic groups “have turned to Islam . . . as the only 
overarching identity that could give them the chance to define them-
selves and to achieve their goals.”184 Some political groups, seizing 
an opportunity to turn faith into political returns, use Islam to pro-
mote nationalist struggles against the Russian government.185 
Though Muslims in Russia generally turn to traditional Islam, 
“fundamentalism exists and its ideas and slogans are popular among 
a certain section of Russia’s Muslims.”186 Islamic extremists have 
earned the government’s ire, but their position should not be a re-
flection on the entire Muslim community. As one Muslim voice, rep-
resentative of the view of traditional Muslims, has pointed out, 
“[t]he Muslims of Russia want law and order in their country, they 
want strong power able to protect them against bandits and terror-
ists, and foreign invaders; they want a government that would give 
them a chance to work and earn, and to ensure freedom of con-
sciousness.”187 Their biggest concern is “that the Russian Federation 
should remain a secular state and that none of the religions should 
be preferred.”188 By allowing Muslims to continue to develop their 
communities and worship freely, the Russian government can guar-
antee the support of a majority of the Muslim community. If the 
 
 181. Yaacov Ro’i, The Secularization of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas, in MUSLIM 
EURASIA, supra note 45, at 5, 15. 
 182. Alexei Malashenko, Does Islamic Fundamentalism Exist in Russia?, in MUSLIM 
EURASIA, supra note 45, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Malashenko, Islamic Fundamentalism]. 
 183. Ro’i, supra note 181, at 15. 
 184. Paul Goble, Russia: Analysis from Washington—Nationalism and Islam, Islam and 
Nationalism, Radio Free Europe (Aug. 11, 1999) (visited Jan. 18, 2001) <http:// 
www.rferl.org>. 
 185. See Malashenko, Russian Nationalism, supra note 160, at 46; Zverev, supra note 
106, at 134–135. 
 186. Malashenko, Islamic Fundamentalism, supra note 182, at 43. 
 187. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗11. 
 188. Id. at ∗8. 
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Russians would avoid singling out Muslims as the source of their 
problems and focus on the real issue—terrorism and the terrorists 
who perform it—the Muslim community would feel less persecuted. 
Unfortunately, the government has not yet employed this method of 
cementing a positive relationship with the Muslims. 
B. Political Interference in Islamic Affairs Must Stop 
Religious groups in Russia have long been manipulated by the 
state, especially under the Communists. “[T]he Communists devel-
oped a theory of treating religion as a ‘necessary evil’ in order to 
have it as a tool for implementing the Communist ideology.”189 Now 
that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution, the separa-
tion of church and state should be inviolate. However, as the 1997 
law shows, the government is unwilling to give up all control over 
religious beliefs. In addition, there is an unfortunate trend to “in-
creas[e] the politicization of religion,” and manipulate religious or-
ganizations to obtain political power.190 To curb this disturbing 
trend, Russia should look to the European Court of Human Rights, 
since “[it] is the international tribunal with the most developed case 
law in the area of freedom of conscience.”191 Since Russia ratified the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in May of 1998, it has exhibited a willing-
ness to submit to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights.192 
An example of government interference with religious organiza-
tions occurred recently in Tatarstan when President Shaimiyev ma-
nipulated the election so that his candidate would be chosen as mufti 
of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. Because of his ac-
tions against the government, the head mufti in Tatarstan, Gabdulla 
Galliulin, incurred the anger of President Shaimiyev, who managed 
to have him replaced as head mufti by a handpicked supporter. In 
February 1998, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan held a 
 
 189. Basova, supra note 59, at 185–86. 
 190. Andrei Oskarovich Protopopov, Church-State Relations in the Russian Federation, 
1996 BYU L. REV. 853, 866. 
 191. Joseph Brossart, Legitimate Regulation of Religion? European Court of Human 
Rights Religious Freedom Doctrine and the Russian Federation Law “On Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Organizations”, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 297, 301 (1999). 
 192. See European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Ratifications (last modified March 
19, 2001) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/DatesOfRatifications.html>. 
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convention where delegates would decide whether to reelect Gal-
liulin as the head mufti of the Directorate.193 Though delegates were 
to be picked by their fellow believers, local government authorities 
actually appointed most of them.194 Unlike previous conventions, 
this one had a strong police presence, including the presence of 
high-ranking government officials, and was even opened with a 
speech by President Shaimiyev.195 While President Shaimiyev “did 
not publicly support any candidate; ‘he followed a subtle policy.’”196 
All the delegates knew that the President wanted Gusman Isakhov to 
be elected head mufti. Unsurprisingly, Isakhov won the election, and 
immediately the government loaned 500,000 new rubles, the equiva-
lent of $82,000, to the Muslims.197 In return, Isakhov promised to 
support President Shaimiyev in the next elections. The Tatarstan 
president successfully installed a puppet leader in Tatarstan’s Muslim 
Spiritual Directorate, compromising the integrity of that organiza-
tion and possibly threatening the stability of the religious environ-
ment in the province. One observer called this action “probably the 
greatest violation of religious freedom in [1998] in Russia.”198 De-
spite the fact that Muslim and Orthodox peacefully coexisted in 
Tatarstan, the actions of the secular government may tear that peace 
apart. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has dealt with 
this situation in two different cases and determined that such actions 
violate the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.199 The Case 
 
 193. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Tatarstan Government Dictates Muslims’ Choice of Spiritual 
Leader, KESTON NEWS SERV., May 26, 1998. 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. (quoting a member of the Tatarstan government’s Council for Religious Affairs). 
 197. See id. 
 198. Whither Human Rights in Russia?, supra note 148, at 37. 
 199. Both cases involved alleged violations of Article 9 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], which states: 
  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
  Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limi-
tations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the in-
terests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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of Serif v. Greece involved the appeal of a Muslim religious leader 
from a decision by a Greek court finding him guilty of usurping the 
functions of a minister.200 A few months after the President of Greece 
confirmed one man as the Mufti of Rodopi, two Members of Parlia-
ment “requested the State to organise elections for the post of Mufti 
of Rodopi.”201 Despite the appointment, the Members of Parliament 
wanted the opportunity to elect their own mufti. Though the gov-
ernment did not reply to this request, elections were nevertheless 
held and Serif was elected Mufti of Rodopi.202 This election con-
flicted with the President’s appointment and could not be considered 
legal because the government did not give the approval to hold the 
election. After acting in this capacity for a few months, the public 
prosecutor “instituted criminal proceedings against [Serif] . . . for 
having usurped the functions of a minister . . . and for having pub-
licly worn the uniform of such a minister without having the right to 
do so.”203 When the courts in Greece found Serif guilty of the 
charges, he appealed to the ECHR. 
The court first noted that “while religious freedom is primarily a 
matter of individual conscience, it also includes, inter alia, freedom, 
in community with others and in public, to manifest one’s religion in 
worship and teaching.”204 Although the court agreed that the gov-
ernment had a legitimate purpose in trying to “preserve order,”205 it 
held that “[t]he role of the authorities [when a religious community 
becomes divided] is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminat-
ing pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other.”206 The court decided that religious pluralism in modern times 
should tolerate a rift between religious factions; the State cannot in-
terfere with leadership decisions because the members of religious 
groups have the right to choose who should lead them.207 
In the Case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, the ECHR had to 
 
 200. Serif v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. no. 38161/97) ¶ 18 (1999) . 
 201. Id. ¶ 9. Apparently the petitioners were unhappy with the government’s appoint-
ment. 
 202. See id. 
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decide a similar issue.208 The applicants, Hasan and Chaush, claimed 
that the Bulgarian government forced their replacement as leaders in 
the Muslim religious community.209 Hasan had been elected Chief 
Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims in 1992, and the Directorate of Reli-
gious Denominations registered him as such.210 A few years later, a 
national conference, organized by people outside of Hasan’s Muslim 
religious organization, was held and an alternative leadership was 
elected.211 After this conference, “the newly elected leaders applied 
to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for registration as the 
legitimate leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria.”212 The government let 
the new leadership take over, apparently believing “that the Muslim 
religion in Bulgaria could have only one leadership” contrary to prior 
practices with other religions.213 
When Mr. Hasan appealed to the ECHR, it held that “the be-
liever’s right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that 
the community will be allowed to function peacefully free from arbi-
trary State intervention.”214 Finally, the court held “that the interfer-
ence with the internal organisation of the Muslim community and 
the applicants’ freedom of religion was not ‘prescribed by law’ in 
that it was arbitrary and was based on legal provisions which allowed 
an unfettered discretion to the executive and did not meet the 
required standards of clarity and foreseeability.”215 The court held 
that the arbitrary government interference with an internal religious 
organization violated Article 9216 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
protects religious freedom.217 If the situation that occurred in 
Tatarstan were brought before the ECHR, it is likely that the court 
would find a violation of religious freedom. 
As Russia is asserting its new identity and guaranteeing new 
rights to religious freedom and conscience, it can little afford to 
 
 208. See Hasan v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. no. 30985/96) (2000). 
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 210. See id. ¶ 13. 
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jeopardize the transition process. The people need to feel that they 
can legitimately rely on the State to protect their new-found reli-
gious liberty. If government leaders interfere in the process of pick-
ing the religious leaders, the people will recognize that their free-
doms are guaranteed on paper only. As a minority religion in a 
country that gives special status to the Russian Orthodox Church, 
any interference by the government is likely to be seen as an attempt 
to limit the religious beliefs of the Muslim community. By alienating 
the Muslim community in this way, even local government officials 
can incite rebellion that takes on a political, rather than a religious, 
character. 
C. By Focusing Its Anger on “Islamic Extremists,” Russia Harms all 
Islam 
In recent years, Russia has been plagued with terrorist activities, 
from the war in Chechnya to bombings in Moscow, most of which 
are blamed on Islamic extremists. Thousands are dead because of 
these terrorists. Authorities have associated these activities with 
Wahhabism. Many have noted that “the media is busy presenting 
Wahhabism as the main enemy of Russia.”218 Because people know 
that Wahhabism is associated with Islam, the rhetoric against 
Wahhabism affects the public perception of Islam as a whole. 
However, because Wahhabism is not necessarily synonymous with 
Islamic extremism, intimately associating the two harms all Islam. 
While the Russian government and Muslim communities wish to 
fight against Wahhabism, different approaches have been suggested 
to combat the movement. The government pursues an approach 
intended to crush the Wahhabites, while members of the Muslim 
community prefer to defend it by converting Muslims to traditional 
Islam and away from extremism. The violent method utilized by the 
government has not worked and probably encourages more people 
to support the Wahhabites. 
Government authorities “have been careful to distinguish be-
tween their current adversaries [the Wahhabites] and Muslims in 
general.”219 By separating Wahhabism from the rest of Islam, the au-
thorities stress that they are not anti-Islam, only anti-extremism. 
However, by turning Wahhabism and Islamic extremism into a “po-
 
 218. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗11. 
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litical threat to the institutional expression of the state,” Russian au-
thorities have negatively affected society’s perception of Islam as a 
whole.220 
 
Though the government officially does not blame the entire 
Muslim community for the problems in Chechnya and for terrorist 
bombings, the Russian people find it difficult to disassociate 
Wahhabites from Muslims. When the government blamed a series of 
bomb attacks in Russian cities on Chechen terrorists, its “allegations 
simply confirmed the anti-Chechen, and generally anti-Caucasian, 
prejudice they already harboured.”221 These kinds of allegations re-
sult in negative attitudes toward all people who “might be from the 
Caucuses and to Muslims in general.”222 Some claim that the Russian 
authorities even used prejudicial attitudes against Muslims to gain 
support for the war in Chechnya, which leads to the perception that 
Islam is synonymous with terrorism.223 In a recent survey of young 
Russians, eighty percent of the respondents “said that Islam was a 
‘bad thing.’”224 Muslims have been denied permission to open 
mosques and cemeteries in the Volga Region because local towns-
people have negative opinions about Muslims and Orthodox clergy 
fear “the ‘excessive zeal’ of Islam.”225 When Russian newspapers 
print interviews where extremists boast that “[they] will enter Mos-
cow with swords in our hands” and say “[i]t will become a Muslim 
city,” it is reasonable for many people to become nervous.226 These 
kind of statements must be condemned as words of a terrorist. 
Instead of merely combating terrorism, Russian authorities are 
increasing fears and prejudices against Muslims by maintaining a 
negative campaign against Wahhabism. 
Some state institutions in Russia have called for the government 
to ban Wahhabism, a suggestion that has caused concern among 
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Russia’s Muslim leaders.227 These leaders point out that before any 
type of ban becomes effective, however, the government must clearly 
define what Wahhabism is.228 This may not be easy and will probably 
infringe on the right to freedom of conscience that is guaranteed by 
the Russian Constitution. Despite the possibility of abuses, Russia’s 
Security Council reportedly “recommended that national legislation 
on the freedom of conscience and religious organisations be 
amended to outlaw Wahhabism.”229 While nothing yet has been 
done about this, it would be a horrible mistake for the government 
to ban Wahhabism. 
Muslim leaders would much rather have the government focus 
its efforts against terrorism and not against religion. Islamic leaders 
have stressed that “Islam calls for peace, mutual tolerance and re-
spect.”230 One proposal suggests that “[t]errorists and bandits should 
be destroyed while Wahhabism as an ideology should be opposed 
with another ideology which the Muslims of Russia will be ready to 
embrace.”231 This idea recognizes that Wahhabism can be counter-
acted by religious teachings that encourage peace and mutual respect 
rather than violence. It suggests that, as a religion, Wahhabism can 
be counteracted by preaching and living true Islam, while the gov-
ernment should fight terrorism punishing the crime, not the belief. 
Terrorism should not be blamed on religion because it blights the 
entire religion instead of focusing on the acts of the individual. As 
another has suggested, the “well-being in the country can be 
achieved only through lasting peace and accord between all people of 
various faiths.”232 By punishing the entire religious movement for the 
acts of individual terrorists, the authorities legitimize violence and 
prejudice against all members of a particular religion. In this case, 
publicizing terrorist acts as the fruit of Muslim believers creates the 
assumption that all Muslims are bad and should be feared. By pun-
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ishing the terrorists and combating the religious movement through 
religious teaching, Islamic leaders can improve the lives of Muslims 
and establish better, positive, and effective relationships with Russian 
authorities. 
 
Russia needs to combat religious extremism, not with violence 
and interference, but by allowing the religious community to police 
itself. While terrorists should be punished, Wahhabism, as a religious 
movement, can only be effectively challenged by religious teachings, 
not by government repression. Marat Murtazin, Rector of the Mos-
cow Islamic University put it well when he wrote, “[w]e do hope 
that in Russia today we shall find enough wisdom and will-power in 
our souls not to turn the great country into a testing ground of a 
dubious theory and an arena of armed clashes in which our state and 
whole nations will perish.”233 
D. Ignoring the Muslim Community Will Only Incite Religious 
Conflicts 
While Russian society’s “attitude to Muslim fundamentalism is 
generally critical or negative, [its attitude] to Islam [is] indiffer-
ent.”234 Though only a minority of Russian citizens are Muslim, it is 
a significant minority. Because of its close proximity to many Islamic 
countries and shared borders with others, Russia can little afford to 
offend its neighbors by treating Islam with prejudice, let alone indif-
ference.235 Trying to develop contemporary ideas of freedom of relig-
ion and conscience can be difficult especially when there are support-
ers from many different religious confessions trying to get the 
government’s attention. While the West wants the Russian govern-
ment to address the mistreatment of minority Christian religions, 
Russia needs to also focus on the needs of the Islamic community. 
By ignoring or stigmatizing the Muslim population, Russia could be 
creating the catalyst for organized religious opposition. 
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Under the Soviets, the government developed a policy of divide 
and rule. This policy, attributed to Stalin, emphasized limiting politi-
cal power of minorities by preventing minorities from “being exclu-
sively concentrated within the borders of its ‘national homeland,’ 
and . . . [] forming a solid majority within it.”236 By dividing ethnic 
groups between “different autonomous units” and assuring that a 
number of loyal groups, such as ethnic Russians, lived in these units, 
the government could undermine or neutralize the voice of conten-
tious minorities.237 A consequence of this policy is that the Muslim 
community is still very divided along ethnic lines and among differ-
ent political units within Russia.238 
Because the Muslim community in Russia is so divided, many 
feel it is unlikely that a united front could be developed to challenge 
the current system. For example, there are “about seventy aboriginal 
ethnic groups . . . found in the Caucasus, speaking languages 
belonging to three different linguistic families.”239 There are about 
twenty significant ethnic groups that follow an Islamic tradition.240 
Although the Muslim community is more concentrated in the North 
Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan, there are Muslims 
throughout the country. This division along ethnic, linguistic, and 
geographic lines significantly increases the difficulties of fomenting a 
unified Islamic movement. Because unity is thought to be unlikely, it 
is easy to focus on the small conflicts that occur rather than 
addressing the overarching concerns of which the small conflicts are 
a symptom. However, the possibility that the Muslim community 
could become united against the state is not so inconceivable. By 
ignoring the big problems, the largest of which is societal prejudice 
against ethnic Muslims, the Russian authorities show their 
indifference to the interests of the Muslim community. 
While the Muslim community is fragmented along many fronts, 
there are also several common threads that unify it. Some suggest 
that their  “common struggle against Russian and Soviet rule” and 
“shared suffering at the hands of both the Russian imperial and the 
Soviet authorities” unite the Muslim community.241 However, “Rus-
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sian diplomacy has been quite adept at manipulating the geopolitical 
divisions within the Muslim world.”242 The policy of divide and rule 
provided methods for the government to limit the intensity of these 
unifying characteristics by rewarding loyalty, thereby pacifying some 
Muslim peoples. Despite this effect, continued government crack-
downs on Muslim communities, justified as attempts to eliminate ex-
tremist groups, may be the catalyst that unifies the Muslims. “[I]f 
some sort of common Muslim front ever emerges in Russia, resent-
ment of Moscow will be the only factor that holds it together.”243 
Because Russian authorities can influence how Muslims are treated in 
Russia, they have the power to determine whether the Muslim com-
munity develops this common feeling of resentment. 
Russia needs to realize the importance of seriously addressing the 
needs of the Muslim community. The policies of the past, such as di-
vide and rule, will not work in a democratic and pluralistic society. 
Authorities cannot treat Russia as an Orthodox state “with the 
Muslims surviving as a tolerated minority.”244 Trying to establish 
government along that pattern will only unite the Muslims in their 
dissatisfaction with the state. Most Russians share the same desires: 
to be able to work, believe, and live in an open society – the things 
denied them under the Communist regime. By seeking true 
solutions that will assure that Muslims and Orthodox Russians can 
live together peacefully, the government will enable the uniting of 
the Muslim community with them, rather than against them. 
Historically, “both Russian people and institutions . . . gravitate 
toward political autocracy, ethnic intolerance, and a single estab-
lished religion or predominant ideology.”245 Russia cannot afford to 
be guided by its own history. It needs to break with the past and 
overcome prejudicial attitudes, intolerance of religious minorities, 
and state interference in religious affairs. If Russia will take these 
steps, it can reach its potential as a pluralistic nation that allows its 
large Muslim minority to associate peacefully with the Russian Or-
thodox majority. 
What does the future hold for Islam in Russia? Muslims have 
lived in Russia for a thousand years. They will live there for a thou-
 
 242. Chaos in the Caucasus, supra note 219, at 26. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗4. 
 245. Lekhel, supra note 59, at 231. 
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sand more. Whether they remain at peace with the ruling authority 
depends on what actions the government will take. In most of Rus-
sia, Muslims face few official obstacles restricting their ability to 
openly practice their religion. The U.S. State Department summed 
up the current situation by observing that “[a]lthough Jews and 
Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and societal discrimina-
tion . . . they generally have not been inhibited by the authorities in 
the free practice of their religion.”246 If the government does nothing 
to discourage prejudice and societal discrimination, then relations 
will begin to sour and extremist views will find supporters among the 
Muslim population. If genuine religious freedom can be fostered in 
the provinces of Russia, then most of Russia’s religious problems will 
sort themselves out.247 Though persecution and discrimination cur-
rently exist, Russia can take steps to avoid religious conflict with its 
Muslim community by addressing the issues discussed in this paper: 
developing a more tolerant attitude in the government toward Mus-
lims, refusing to interfere in internal religious affairs, and focusing its 
efforts on eradicating terrorism, not Wahhabism. 
Russia is now “a pluralistic society in which the most disparate 
elements will have to learn to live together.”248 Most of the political 
leaders of the country recognize the need for peaceful relations be-
tween Russia and its large Muslim population. Even Aleksandr Le-
bed, a strong nationalist, when mentioning the traditional religions 
of Russia, listed Islam with Orthodoxy and Buddhism.249 Russia bor-
ders very close to a number of Middle Eastern countries and has 
strong economic ties with Islamic nations. “Russia shares a more sig-
nificant strategic interest with Turkey, Iran, Tajikistan, and other 
Central Asian and Middle Eastern states than it does with the 
West.”250 For these reasons, the Russian government can little afford 
to offend the Muslim community. 
Some people claim that Russian action in Chechnya and the re-
pression of Islamic extremism may incite religious conflict.251 Others 
 
 246. 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗8. 
 247. See COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN RUSSIA, 
BRIEFING OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 9 (1997) 
(statement of Lawrence Uzzell, Moscow Representative of the Keston Institute). 
 248. Bourdeaux, supra note 36, at 159. 
 249. See id. 
 250. Arzt, supra note 9, at 468. 
 251. See Chaos in the Caucasus, supra note 219, at 26. One newspaper article stated, 
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point out that Muslims may become more persecuted because they 
have no one “to speak up for them in the West.”252 Others can see 
Russia becoming a greater enemy in the eyes of the Islamic world 
than the United States because of government attempts to repress 
Muslim extremism.253 While this may be a possibility, at least the 
rhetoric of political leaders has not yet affected the relationship be-
tween religious leaders. As mentioned previously, in several situations 
in Tatarstan, the Muslim and Orthodox clergy have supported each 
other in their common goals to rebuild and reestablish their religious 
communities. If the Russian government will support traditional 
Muslim faiths and allow these Muslims the full freedoms they are 
guaranteed by the 1993 Constitution without interference, it will be 
able to contain the growth of Wahhabi extremism. However, if the 
government restricts all Muslim faith in that part of the country in 
order to combat the growth of extremism, their attempt will back-
fire. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Under the 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience and on 
Religious Associations,” Islam has experienced relatively few 
problems registering with the government. Instead, the biggest 
challenge has come from political partisanship and societal attitudes. 
While the Muslim population, for the most part, continues to 
support the Russian government, government actions could lead to 
the growth of Islamic extremism if they are perceived to be anti-
Muslim. If Russia wants to avoid religious conflicts with its Muslim 
population, the government needs to support the growth of 
traditional Muslim faiths and encourage religious toleration. Russia 
has only experienced religious freedom for ten years, after seventy 
years of repression of all religions. As the country continues to 
develop, Islam will continue to play an important role in Russian 
politics and culture. Because tolerance is not just a word, but an 
action, Russia holds its destiny in its own hands. 
 
“Muslim anger has been inflamed by contact with Caucasian Muslims, driven from their rug-
ged mountains.” Michael Jansen, Chechen War Angers Muslims, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at 
12. 
 252. Whither Human Rights in Russia?, supra note 149, at 29. 
 253. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 467–68. 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER AND LOCATION OF MOSQUES THROUGHOUT 
RUSSIA BY REGION AND CITY254 
 
REGIONS NUMBER OF MOSQUES 
Northern Caucuses More than 5000 
Tatarstan More than 850 
Bashkortostan More than 400 
CITIES  
Makhachkala (Dagestan) 36 










 254. ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 15. 
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TABLE 2: THE EXTENT OF MUSLIM INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA SHOWN 
BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL MEMBERSHIP OF DUMER255 
 
Member associations of the DUMER include: 








Moscow          20256 20 5  
Moskovskii Oblast 16    
Krasnodar 5    
Nizhni Novgorod 3 48 48  
Kostroma 1    
Kaliningrad 1    
Yaroslavl 2  1 1 
Smolensk 1    
Tula 1    
Orel 1    
Mordovia 3    
Kursk 1    
Ivanovo 1   1 
Vologda 1   1 
Vladimir 3    
Rostov 5    
St. Petersburg 1  1 1 
Samara 1    
Tambov 1    
Tver 2  1 1 
Penza 2 40 50  
Chuvashia 2    
 
 
 255. See id. at 73–80. 
 256. Id. at 33. 
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TABLE 3: MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION257 
 
Muslim Ethnic Group Population 
Tatars  5,543,000 
Bashkirs 1,345,000 
Chechens 899,000 
Kazakhs  636,000 
Avars 544,000 
Kabardinins (Circassians)  386,000 
Dargins 353,000 
Azerbaijanis  277,000 
Kumyks  257,000 
Ingushes  215,000 
Karachays 150,000 
Digor Ossetians∗ 130,000 
Uzbeks 127,000 
Adygeys (Circassians) 125,000 
Laks 106,000 
Total ∗∗ 11,699,000 
 
∗Estimate of 130,000 based on population of 402,000 for all Os-
setians, most of whom are Eastern Orthodox. 
∗∗Additional Muslim ethnic groups with populations, each under 
100,000, are Nogay Tatars, Tabassarans, Aguly, Rutuls, and 
Tsakhurs—all in Dagestan. 
 
 
 257. This table is taken directly out of Arzt, supra note 9, at 475 (based on information 
from the 1989 USSR All-Union Census). 
